Does Abandoning the “Makhzenization” of the Amazigh Language Signal a Return to Exclusionary Policies?

The Ajdir Decree and the Launch of the “Makhzenization” of the Amazigh Language

With the Royal Decree (Dahir) of Ajdir on October 17, 2001, which established the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM), the Amazigh cause entered a new phase. This era can be described as revolutionary—a genuine break from the status quo. In fact, the progress made often exceeded the expectations of certain Amazigh activists, whose demands at the time had not yet reached the level of the rights and recognition established by this decree in favor of the Amazigh language and culture.

Because the Amazigh question is inherently political and inextricably linked to the identity of the state, the only way to address Amazigh demands without challenging the state’s official identity—defined as “Arab” in political practice since 1912—was to rehabilitate the Amazigh language, culture, and ethnicity as belonging to a minority of Moroccans in specific regions. However, this was done without acknowledging it as the identity of the state itself—that is, the collective identity of all Morocco and the entire Moroccan people. This state approach, which reduces the Amazigh cause to linguistic, cultural, and ethnic claims, is the core of the “new Berber policy” (a concept explored in the article “The Failure of the New Berber Policy,” published in the book The “Berber Decree”: Reality or Myth?). This represents a new iteration of the “makhzenization” of the Amazigh language: a strategy of co-option by the Makhzen (the traditional governing establishment) aimed at making the cause “royal,” dependent, and subordinate, ensuring it serves and is utilized by the state. This process works by narrowing Amazigh demands to linguistic, cultural, and ethnic issues that can be addressed as long as they remain politically “neutral” and pose no threat to the state’s Makhzen system.

While the “makhzenization” of the Amazigh cause—embodied by the “new Berber policy” initiated with the creation of IRCAM—was beneficial, it did not resolve the core of the problem. This recognition led to undeniable progress in the media and education (despite hesitations and a lack of serious commitment to school integration) and the adoption of an official alphabet (Tifinagh). Yet, this breakthrough failed to tackle the fundamental political issue: the political exclusion of the Amazigh identity. This exclusion stems from the fact that political power in Morocco has been exercised since 1912 not in the name of an Amazigh identity—the state’s roots in its North African territory—but in the name of an “Arab” identity, with Morocco being considered an “Arab” state since that date. This translates into a political displacement that takes precedence over linguistic or cultural marginalization: the Amazigh language is denied a political existence because it lacks sovereign power. That power is now wielded in the name of ethnic Arabism rather than African Amazighity. Consequently, while Imazighen today enjoy a linguistic, cultural, and historical presence, they remain politically absent; they have lacked a state of their own since 1912, when Morocco became an “Arab” state in an ethnic rather than geographical sense. Ultimately, while the Amazigh language and people have gained formal recognition, they have faced political exclusion for over a century. It is this exclusion that remains the source and origin of all other forms of marginalization, whether linguistic, cultural, or historical (see: “On the Political Exclusion of Amazighity” in the book On Amazighity and Amazighophobia).

A retreat from even the “Makhzenization” of Amazigh identity

As the process of rehabilitating Amazigh identity unfolded, the state was expected to move beyond its “new Berber policy”—which fundamentally seeks to “Makhzenize” Amazigh identity by absorbing it into the traditional power structure—toward a long-awaited “Amazigh policy.” This shift would involve “Amazighizing” the Makhzen itself, integrating the state apparatus into the Amazigh identity rather than the reverse. This implies that the state should exercise political authority in the name of its Amazigh and African roots, acting as an Amazigh state in a territorial sense to align its identity with its geographical location (on the distinction between “Amazigh policy” and “Berber policy,” see the chapter “When will we move from ‘Berber policy’ to ‘Amazigh policy’?” in the book The Berber Dahir: Reality or Myth?). Failing that, while waiting for the conditions for such a transformation to emerge, the state should have at least strengthened its “Berber policy” of Makhzenization. This would have meant successfully implementing Amazigh language education, solidifying its presence in the media, integrating its oral use into public administration, and dismantling the many “scientific” lies surrounding Amazigh identity, such as the myth of the “Berber Dahir.” Yet, paradoxically, as soon as the Amazigh language was granted official status in the July 2011 Constitution, the Makhzen state began to backpedal, even on its own policy of Makhzenization officially adopted in 2001.

Clear signs of this retreat include:

— The near-total “disappearance” of Amazigh language teaching, which was launched in 2003, following its constitutional officialization. This project ultimately suffered a fate similar to that of the “Talsint oil,” the discovery of which the King had announced in an official speech on August 20, 2000, before it was revealed to be a massive deception that had misled the Moroccan state.

— The suspension of its legal officialization for more than eight years, under the pretext of waiting for an organic law. In practice, this official status has been deferred indefinitely, as the law in question does not actually mandate the state’s official use of the Amazigh language.

— The very content of this organic law, which aims not to make the language official, but to bury any genuine officialization by reducing it to a purely decorative and symbolic status. It will never make the Amazigh language a language of institutions, administration, or official documents (see “An Organic Law to Bury the Officialization of Amazigh”).
— Finally, the dissolution of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) under the guise of integrating it into the National Council of Moroccan Languages and Culture (Articles 50 and 51 of that Council’s organic law). This signifies the outright abandonment of the Makhzenization of Amazigh identity and the end of the “Berber policy,” which was merely the procedural implementation of that process. Why does the dissolution of IRCAM mark this abandonment? Because the creation of this institution inaugurated the policy; it expressed a reconciliation with Amazigh identity and its recognition within the realms of culture, linguistics, and ethnicity. This was the framework permitted by the “new Berber policy”: removing cultural and identity-based exclusion while maintaining political exclusion. The latter will only end when the state stops exercising power in the name of an adopted identity that is foreign to its African and Amazigh territorial roots.

This disengagement from Makhzenization and the resulting abandonment of the “Berber policy”—which represented the minimum threshold of recognition after half a century of total exclusion—amounts to a planned return to that very same comprehensive exclusion. This is an exclusion that is simultaneously cultural, linguistic, and identity-based, coupled with the political exclusion that is the source of all others. This stance represents a veritable “coup d’état” in the management of the Amazigh question. It nullifies all the gains in recognition and reconciliation achieved through royal decree, which aimed to lift the ostracism Amazigh identity has suffered since independence. How and why did this reversal occur?

This is what we will analyze and attempt to clarify in a future article.

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