And when full normalization with Berber languages?

Even after the closure of the Israeli Liaison Office in Rabat at the end of 2000, a limited form of normalization with Israel had always existed, manifested through discreet, unofficial commercial and human ties—including mutual visits—between Morocco and the Jewish State. Then came December 22, 2020, when Morocco officially and publicly signed a cooperation and friendship agreement with Israel, establishing full, complete, and effective normalization. This event came as a total surprise. For more than seventy years, the Moroccan public had been indoctrinated with the idea that Jews were enemies of the nation and of God. In this context, embarking on the path of normalization was a perilous move for the authorities, as it risked offending a Moroccan sensibility forged by decades of hostility toward Israel. This sentiment had become a fixture of Friday sermons, an omnipresent theme in the writings of intellectuals and speeches of politicians, and a deeply ingrained conviction shared by both the educated elite and the general public. The decision was all the less predictable given that it took place under a government led by a party that had built its entire political and ideological capital on anti-Israel rhetoric and the demonization of Jews. This is why normalization was a seismic shock, directly confronting a purported Moroccan “consensus” that treated the rejection of normalization as dogma and any rapprochement as treason, betrayal, and allegiance to Zionism. The shock was even more jarring because the signatory of this full normalization agreement was none other than the Head of Government himself, who was also the Secretary General of the Justice and Development Party (PJD)—an organization that had made its unyielding opposition to normalization and “normalizers” its fundamental reason for being, as well as the bedrock of its religious preaching and political engagement. Yet this entire process, which had seemed impossible before December 22, 2020, unfolded in complete calm, as if it were nothing more than an ordinary formality.

What, then, is the connection between this normalization and the Amazigh identity mentioned in the headline of this article?

The primary commonality between Israel and Amazigh identity lies in the existence of a political culture in Morocco that is fiercely hostile to both. This culture stems from a single source: Morocco’s identity-based dependence on the Arabs of the Middle East. The country views itself as a mere extension of the East, claiming an exclusive affiliation with the Arab world. While it is understandable that Morocco, acting as a “branch” connected to its perceived roots, aligns itself with the hostility of Arab states in conflict with the Hebrew state, the political exclusion of Amazigh identity serves a different purpose. It aims to convince those same Arabs that Morocco is not “Berber”—contrary to what they might think—but is just as Arab as they are. This logic dictates that the enemy of the Arabs automatically becomes the enemy of Moroccans. This is the case with Israel, which Moroccans reject because “true” Arabs reject it. Consequently, the political sidelining of Amazigh identity seeks to clear up any ambiguity regarding Morocco’s Arab identity and provide Middle Easterners with proof of its identity loyalty. It is therefore unsurprising that hostility toward Israel is sometimes more virulent in Morocco than in some Middle Eastern Arab countries, as evidenced by massive demonstrations of solidarity with Palestine and condemnation of Israel—protests that are unparalleled in any Arab state in that region. In short, hostility toward Israel and the political exclusion of Amazigh identity are two tools serving the same goal: to convince both themselves and others that Morocco is Arab, and that Arab causes and enemies are inherently Morocco’s own. This explains why those hostile to Israel are precisely the same people who oppose Amazigh identity, going so far as to label the Amazigh movement “Zionist” and its activists “pro-Zionist.”

Regarding the Amazigh language, the state has shown a form of recognition since the Ajdir Dahir of October 17, 2001, which established the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture. This initiative began the process of integrating the Amazigh language into media and education, though this process remains incomplete and lacks genuine political will. Recognition reached a second stage with the constitutional officialization of the Amazigh language in the 2011 Constitution. However, despite these significant gains achieved through royal decree, the state continues to act as an Arab state, exercising its authority in the name of a claimed—and usurped—Arab identity. It persists in the political exclusion of the Amazigh language, refusing to recognize it as the collective identity of Morocco and the Moroccan state itself. The state refuses to embrace its status as an Amazigh state, in both identity and affiliation, or to exercise its power in that name. Such recognition would require actively promoting the Amazigh language by effectively implementing its official status, which would involve making its teaching both mandatory and standardized. Only then can it become a language of the state and its institutions. Ultimately, the major breakthroughs achieved since 2001 represent only a limited and incomplete form of normalization by the state. Full normalization will only be achieved when the state acknowledges that it is Amazigh in its essence and affiliation, and exercises political authority in the name of that identity.

If the state has not yet taken the step of recognizing the Amazigh identity as the collective identity of the Moroccan nation and people—which, as I have noted, would mark total normalization and end its political exclusion—it is primarily because it cannot politically ignore the persistence of an “Amazigh-phobic” culture inherited from the “National Movement.” This hostility remains particularly vibrant within Islamist and nationalist parties, whose ideological influence remains substantial. Thus, this state recognition of the Amazigh identity, currently confined only to language and culture, amounts to a minimal and incomplete normalization. By refusing to endorse this collective identity for the state and the Moroccan people under pressure from this “Amazigh-phobic” culture, the current situation is strikingly reminiscent of the relationship that existed between Morocco and Israel before December 22, 2020. At the time, relations were limited to a partial, unofficial, and non-public normalization, due to the weight of a political culture hostile to Israel and Jews.

By officially and publicly signing the cooperation and friendship agreement with the Hebrew state, the Moroccan state transitioned—defying opponents of normalization—from a partial and limited process to total normalization with Israel. It did so with full awareness of the strong presence of a culture hostile to that state, a culture that brands anyone who establishes relations with it as “pro-Zionist,” as previously mentioned. Following this complete official normalization, which seemed improbable before December 22, 2020, one can argue that this same logic of total normalization must necessarily apply to the Amazigh identity. This is especially true since its detractors have always presented it as a mere appendage of Zionism, as I have already explained. As long as Israel is no longer perceived as a Zionist entity justifying hostility and rupture, it should logically follow—as the branch follows the root—that the animosity toward the Amazigh identity will end, and it can no longer be labeled as Zionism. This would pave the way for the state’s full normalization with its Amazigh identity, by recognizing that it is an Amazigh state—in an identity sense, not an ethnic one—and by lifting the political exclusion this component has suffered since 1912. Furthermore, if the party then leading the government accepted normalization with Israel, it must, to remain consistent, also accept normalization with the Amazigh identity it once fought in the name of its hostility toward Israel. This hostility was clearly evident when many of its supporters characterized the Amazigh identity as Zionism and its advocates as pro-Zionists, as I have noted. One cannot claim that this party remains attached to its principled position of rejecting normalization, despite the misleading rhetoric and maneuvers of its leaders, who are accustomed to playing both sides. Actions matter, not words: the party fully accepted normalization, evidenced by the fact that none of its government officials resigned to express their refusal, particularly since its own Secretary General initialed the cooperation agreement with Israel in his capacity as Head of Government.

Some might argue that Morocco’s full normalization with Israel was a trade-off for American recognition of its sovereignty over its southern provinces, whereas the state would gain no profit or advantage from a complete normalization with its Amazigh identity. This represents a narrow and limited view of sovereignty, reducing it solely to the integration of the Saharan provinces under Moroccan authority. In reality, while full normalization with Israel secured American recognition of sovereignty over the Sahara, full normalization with Amazighité as a national identity would allow Morocco to not only consolidate that recognized sovereignty but also to reclaim total sovereignty over the entirety of Moroccan territory. This sovereignty remained incomplete in terms of identity as long as the country was described as the “Arab Maghreb”—literally meaning the “Maghreb of the Arabs”—thereby placing Moroccan identity under Arab guardianship rather than under a strictly national sovereignty. Full normalization with Amazigh identity, through the recognition of Morocco as an Amazigh state, therefore constitutes a restoration of its full sovereignty over its lands. When I speak of “complete” sovereignty, I mean that it must not be limited to political independence, but must also encompass independence of identity.

It is clear that the decision to fully normalize relations with Israel marks the beginning of an assertion of identity independence. Morocco made this sovereign decision without concern for the potential reactions of Arab or Palestinian parties. It acted as a non-Arab state, for which the Palestinian issue holds an importance similar to that which it holds for other non-Arab countries, such as Turkey, which provides significant support to Palestine while maintaining friendly relations and cooperation with Israel. Furthermore, had Morocco utilized the “Amazigh card” in its management of the Sahara issue by presenting itself as an Amazigh state—and consequently highlighting that the Polisario Front seeks to establish an Arab state (the Sahrawi Arab Republic) on Amazigh lands—its arguments would have gained strength, efficiency, and influence within the international community.

While a full normalization with the Amazigh identity—whereby Morocco would proclaim its Amazigh identity and heritage and exercise its authority in their name—seems almost impossible given the dominance of an “Amazighophobic” trend in Morocco, in both its Islamist and leftist forms, the decision to fully normalize relations with Israel also once seemed nearly impossible under the weight of hostility toward the Hebrew State among these same factions. Yet, this normalization was decided and implemented as an act of State, originating from the highest authority rather than from the government or parliament, whose roles were merely formal. We know that in Morocco, decisions emanating from the State’s high authority leave other powers with no choice but to join in and approve. Thus, if this same authority were to declare that Morocco is an Amazigh Kingdom, the most Amazighophobic parties would rush to welcome the decision, bless it, and consider it a national and historic act serving the superior interests of the nation. This is precisely what we observed with the normalization with Israel, which was accepted in practice, if not in words, by the party most hostile to the Hebrew State, the PJD.

This is why, when we assert that the political exclusion of the Amazigh identity can only be ended through a political decision, we are referring to one coming from the highest authority, not from parliament or the government, despite their undeniable importance. However, although the high authority in Morocco makes its decisions in an apparently unilateral and sovereign manner, it always takes into account, as previously explained, the positions of other influential political actors, whether they are parties or religious and ideological movements. Consequently, the retreat of Amazighophobia within traditionally hostile currents and parties—a corollary to the decline of anti-Semitism following normalization with Israel—is a necessary condition for the State to accelerate its normalization with its own Amazighness. This would involve recognizing Amazigh identity as the identity of the State and acting in the name of its Amazigh belonging, thereby ending its political exclusion. The full recognition of Israel as a friendly state thus removes any potential embarrassment for the State should it decide to fully recognize the Amazigh identity as its collective identity as an Amazigh State. This is especially true since the opponents of the Amazigh identity have always been, as I have already explained, the very same individuals and groups who opposed Israel and rejected normalization.

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