When Imazighen Become Barbarians Hostile to Their Amazigh Identity

The word “barbarian” (plural “barbarians”)—whose meaning has nothing to do with the term “Berber,” even though both are formed from the same root—originates from the Greek (barbaros) and later Latin (barbarus), meaning “the foreigner” (Larousse dictionary). It refers to someone belonging to a different ethnicity and civilization (CNRTL dictionary) from the peoples to whom they represent an outside, foreign element—in other words, a “barbarian,” according to the Greek term preserved unchanged in Latin. That is why the Romans called the inhabitants of North Africa—namely, the Imazighen—”barbarians”: in Roman eyes, they were indeed foreigners, just like the Germanic peoples to whom Rome applied the very same label (barbarus), even though those were European rather than African peoples. From this neutral original meaning of “foreigner,” a secondary, pejorative sense later emerged, denoting someone savage, cruel, backward, or uncivilized…

What matters here, given the subject we are addressing, is that first, original meaning in relation to the collective, original, and true Amazigh identity of Morocco and Moroccans, as well as of North Africa and its Amazigh peoples. Who, then, is the “barbarian”—still in the Greco-Roman sense of the word—in relation to this collective, true Amazigh identity and the inhabitants of Morocco? Put another way, who among Moroccans considers themselves a foreigner to Amazigh identity and to the Imazighen, and acts toward them on that basis—that is, as a foreigner? It is all those who have changed their ancestry, shifting from their Amazigh lineage to an Arab one, viewing themselves as Arabs who belong neither to Amazigh lineage nor to the Amazigh cultural, civilizational, and linguistic sphere. In short, they regard themselves as “barbarians” vis-à-vis Amazigh identity and the Imazighen, in the original sense of the word “barbarian” explained above. Yet for the Greeks and Romans, the “barbarian” was a foreigner both by origin and in fact. The Moroccan “barbarian,” by contrast, is Amazigh by origin and heritage, yet is deeply convinced of being a “barbarian”—in other words, a foreigner to their own Amazigh language and identity.

Imposing a “barbarian” identity on Morocco—and across all of North Africa—in other words, imposing affiliation with a people and an identity foreign to Morocco, has always been the ultimate aim of the collective Arabization policy pursued by Morocco since 1912, just as it was of the individual Arabization that began across North Africa twelve centuries ago. This goal seeks to turn Moroccans into Arabs—that is, into “barbarians” in the sense defined above, strangers to Amazigh identity and to Morocco’s Imazighen, just like real Arabs, who are genuinely foreigners—and therefore “barbarians”—in relation to Amazigh identity and the Imazighen in Morocco and North Africa. Arabization and this shift in ancestry—both national and identity-based—thus constitute a policy designed to “barbarize” Moroccans, turning them into “barbarians,” foreigners to their own Amazigh language and heritage. To ensure the success of this “barbarization” project, “barbarian” family trees were fabricated—lineages foreign to Amazigh identity and the Imazighen, specifically a falsely claimed Arab descent. Darija was also invented, a language with Amazigh meanings and structures but an Arabic vocabulary (see the article “When Will Moroccans Discover Their Darija Language?” in the book “On Arabic, Darija, and Changing One’s Ancestral Identity”), so that this “barbarian” identity would appear authentic, complete, and beyond dispute, prompting neither doubt nor questioning.

Starting in 1912, the process of “barbarization” shifted from an individual choice—driven by the political, religious, and social privileges offered by a “barbarian” lineage—to a collective, institutional one, overseen and substantially funded by the state. That state was created by France for Morocco’s “barbarians,” and under its authority, France subjugated all tribes and regions for the first time in Morocco’s history. From then on, the number of “barbarians” in Morocco—that is, those who declare themselves foreign to Amazigh identity and to the Imazighen—began to grow rapidly, to the point that they eventually came to form a majority compared to the Imazighen who rejected and fought “barbarization,” preserving their original Amazigh affiliation. Indeed, the new Moroccan state created by France in 1912 is a “barbarian” state that claims an Arab affiliation—and is therefore foreign to Amazigh identity, to the Imazighen, and to their Amazigh homeland. This corresponds to the intended meaning of “barbarian” regarding the relationship between foreign Arabness and Amazigh North Africa, based on the original Greek meaning of the word “barbarian” as we have explained it. That is why one of its main national projects after independence was to exclude Amazigh identity to the point of eradicating it, by imposing widespread, total “barbarization” aimed at turning all Moroccans into “barbarians”—meaning strangers, in their identity and linguistic affiliation, to Amazigh identity and to the Imazighen, as reflected in the slogan: “Arabization of man, the environment, and public life.” This project for the total exclusion of Amazigh identity—which became, in Moroccan political consciousness, a jihad and a form of patriotism, a struggle and a progressive cause—succeeded in demonizing Amazigh identity. It turned it into a synonym for colonialism, division, and racism, for evil and discord, and for paganism and pre-Islamic ignorance, as well as an “original sin” for which its Amazigh bearers can only atone by adopting a “barbarian” affiliation as Arabs who are foreign—that is, “barbarians”—to Amazigh identity and to the Imazighen. All of this made Amazigh identity an enemy that had to be fought and eliminated. This explains why Moroccan “barbarians”—that is, those who consider themselves foreign to their Amazigh language and affiliation as a result of the “barbarization” process they underwent—have become some of the fiercest opponents of Amazigh identity. They view it as a colonial legacy and a source of discord, division, and pre-Islamic ignorance, among other things—just as propagated about it by this policy of “barbarization” and of national and identity-based change of lineage, known as the policy of Arabization.

However, at the beginning of this century, after more than half a century of “jihad” against Amazigh identity aimed at excluding it and ridding Morocco of it through the “barbarization” of the remaining Imazighen, Morocco’s “barbarians” became convinced that it was impossible to eradicate Amazigh identity and “barbarize” all Imazighen. They then turned to a solution that was both old and new: the new “Berber policy,” whose earlier version France had already applied to the Imazighen (see the article “The Failure of the New Berber Policy” in the book “The Berber Dahir: Reality or Myth?”). The concept of a “Berber policy” is aptly named: since a “barbarian” is someone who is—or considers themselves—foreign to Amazigh identity, the Imazighen, and Amazigh land, a “Berber policy” is a policy designed and planned for the Imazighen by those who are “barbarians,” meaning those who are foreign to them. It is the policy under which “barbarians”—in other words, non-Imazighen—decide what the Imazighen must be. It is therefore a “barbarian,” or foreign, policy that determines and directs the destiny of the Imazighen. Thus, the old “Berber policy” was devised by the French, who are “barbarians” in relation to the Imazighen—that is, foreigners to them—in order to establish what those Imazighen were to be. In the same way, the new “Berber policy” is devised by “barbarians”—namely those who consider themselves Arabs foreign to Amazigh identity and the Imazighen and who hold decision-making power in Morocco, just as the French “barbarians” once did—to determine what the destiny of the Imazighen must be: a destiny decided and charted by these “barbarians” foreign to Amazigh identity and the Imazighen, who usurp an Arab “barbarian” affiliation that is foreign to an African Amazigh affiliation. The essence of the “Berber policy” therefore lies in its “barbarian” origin—that is, an origin foreign to Amazigh identity, the Imazighen, and Amazigh land (see the article “When Will We Move from the ‘Berber Policy’ to the ‘Amazigh Policy’?” in the book “The Berber Dahir: Reality or Myth?”).

It was this new “Berber policy” that led to the creation of IRCAM (the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture), which marked an official recognition of Amazigh identity within the limits of this new “Berber policy.” The goals of this new “Berber policy” can be summed up as integrating the Imazighen as a “minority” within the “barbarian” system, where the “barbarians” constitute the “majority.” It must be acknowledged, however, that this integration has been beneficial for Amazigh identity—unlike the exclusion it suffered after independence under the “barbarization” policy aimed at eradicating it, as already noted—because it ensures its survival and preservation within the minimal bounds offered by this new “Berber policy.”

However, this new “Berber policy,” which as I wrote was beneficial to Amazigh identity, did not last long. It was brought to an end with the adoption of the so-called official recognition of the Amazigh language in the Constitution of July 1, 2011. That officialization was poison in honey. Indeed, once the sweetness of the honey quickly faded as enthusiasm over making the Amazigh language official died down, the poison kept doing its work slowly, yet steadily and effectively. Today, the results are out in the open: the abolition of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture, which embodied the policy of integrating Amazigh identity into the “barbarian” system as noted earlier, and a return to the situation that predated that integration policy—namely, the phase of total exclusion of Amazigh identity, though softened by a practice taking the form of euthanasia against it. To carry out this euthanasia against Amazigh identity, Organic Law No. 26.16 on implementing the official status of the Amazigh language and Organic Law No. 04.16 on the National Council of Moroccan Languages and Culture were drafted. We have already explained and pointed this out, showing that the purpose of the organic law meant to activate the official status of the Amazigh language is to put its officialization to death (see the article “An Organic Law to Put the Officialization of the Amazigh Language to Death” at this link). And putting its officialization to death means deciding to kill it; it is, however, a form of euthanasia, as I emphasized, because it is the execution of a constitutional provision. The government has already begun carrying out this execution by publishing the text of Bill No. 04.20, which excludes the Amazigh language from the new national identity card. It submitted the bill to the Bureau of the House of Representatives on June 3, 2020, following its approval by the Government Council on March 12, 2020. Through this bill, the government—with great arrogance, defiance, and Amazighophobia—disregards both the Constitution and the organic law on implementing the official status of the Amazigh language, even though it drafted that law itself (see the article “On the Pretext for Excluding the Amazigh Language from the National Card Bill” at this link). Thus, after independence, the Amazigh issue moved from total exclusion to integration—represented by the IRCAM era, a symbol of the new “Berber policy”—before returning to exclusion through its constitutional officialization, which, as I said, is poison concealed in honey and embodies the euthanasia phase of Amazigh identity.

This fate awaiting Amazigh identity, resulting from decisions and laws made about it by people who are foreign to it—that is, “barbarians,” in the sense explained earlier—is entirely logical and natural. That is why it is naive and illusory to expect people who are foreign to Amazigh identity to care for it and promote it seriously and sincerely. Yet what has made them foreign to Amazigh identity—in other words, “barbarians” in their relationship to it—is the fact that they reject it, declare war on it, and show hostility toward it. This is a hostility not found among true Arabs, those of the Middle East. That fact alone is enough to prove that the “barbarians” of Morocco—those who regard themselves as foreign to Amazigh identity and to the Imazighen—are not Arabs as they claim; otherwise, they would treat Amazigh identity the way true Arabs do, showing it no hostility and never declaring war on it.

Therefore, it is impossible to rehabilitate Amazighness as the collective identity of Morocco, Moroccans, and the Moroccan state as long as there is no Amazigh policy—in direct opposition to the “Berber policy”—in which Amazighness holds political decision-making power instead of merely being the object of “Berber” political decisions made about it by people foreign to it. “Since the word ‘Amazigh’ is the name that the Imazighen gave themselves, ‘Amazigh policy’ is the policy that the Imazighen decide for themselves, taking the reins of their own destiny into their own hands. ‘Amazigh policy’ therefore means nothing more than the Imazighen reclaiming their Amazigh sovereignty over their Amazigh land. And this sovereignty can only take the form of an Amazigh state—in the territorial rather than ethnic sense—with Amazigh authority and an Amazigh identity, in harmony with the Amazigh land” (excerpt from the text: “When Will We Move from Berber Policy to Amazigh Policy?”, published in the book “The Berber Dahir…”).

However, it must be recognized that succeeding in establishing Amazigh policy as state policy—with the state viewed as an Amazigh state, again in the civic and territorial sense—requires that Morocco’s misled “barbarians” return to their Amazighness as people who belong to it, rather than as “barbarians,” that is, as strangers to it, thereby moving from rejecting it to proudly claiming and defending it. This return must necessarily be preceded by the state itself returning to its Amazighness. For just as it was the state that carried out the process of Morocco’s “barbarization”—again in the sense explained earlier—as a public policy, it is also the state that must lead the process of its re-Amazighization, in line with what its collective identity was before 1912, once again as a public policy, with everything that implementing such a policy requires in terms of resources, laws, and decisions.

Perhaps the most wretched human being, psychologically and existentially, is the one who has become a stranger to himself, a stranger to his own identity, and a “barbarian” toward his own belonging. Why would he be the most wretched? Because he has no refuge in which to take shelter—the refuge that collective identity provides—and no roots or origins to take pride in, after having disowned them and “barbarized” himself toward them, that is, after having come to view himself as a stranger to them. In terms of identity, he thus lives like a “foundling,” for those whom he believes gave him their identity through adoption do not recognize his belonging to their community. This is precisely the case of Morocco’s “barbarians” who claim an Arab identity, yet whom true Arabs refuse to consider as such, shouting in their faces that they are “barbarians” in both senses of the word: they are “Berbers” in the sense of the Amazigh inhabitants of North Africa, as Arab history books call them, and they are also “barbarians” in the eyes of the Arabs, meaning foreigners to them in the Greek sense of the term “barbarian,” as we saw earlier. Deprived of a recognized collective identity that one is proud to belong to, the Moroccan “barbarian” who rejects his Amazighness thus lives without pride or dignity in his identity. He is condemned to spend his entire life begging actual foreigners to deign to grant him a few crumbs of their authentic Arab identity—an identity that we esteem and whose Arab bearers, proud of belonging to it, we respect, just as we condemn the fact that Morocco’s “barbarians,” again in the sense of strangers to their Amazighness, usurp membership in this Arab identity that denies it to them, out of our rejection of imposture and falsification.

For all these reasons, the return to Amazighness, as the collective identity of Morocco, the Moroccan people, and the Moroccan state, and as a source of pride and honor for all Moroccans, represents a return by the “barbarians” to their Amazigh, non-“barbarian” truth. That is what will free them from identity-based guardianship and from the “barbarian” imposture. Is it not through the truth that human beings emancipate themselves, as the saying attributed to Christ puts it (“The truth will set you free”)?

Arabic version | French version