The Arabic Language in the Book “For a Cultural Revolution in Morocco
The Arabic language occupies an important place in the book For a Cultural Revolution in Morocco (Najah El Jadida Printing Press, Casablanca, 2018, 352 pages; second edition published in 2019), by writer and thinker Professor Hassan Aourid. Following our previous analyses devoted to the status of French and Francophonie in this work (“The Scourge of Francophones in the Book ‘For a Cultural Revolution in Morocco’”, at the link: https://www.hespress.com/writers/420597.html), as well as the place of the Amazigh language in this same book (“The Amazigh Language in the Book ‘For a Cultural Revolution in Morocco’”, at the “Tawiza” link: http://tawiza.byethost10.com/1tawiza-articles/arabe/aourid.htm), this third article examines Professor Aourid’s conception of the role and function of the Arabic language in his aforementioned work.
How fortunate the Arabic language is to have writer Hassan Aourid:
Professor Hassan Aourid acknowledges that Arabic is not a language of science, though he qualifies this judgment by noting: “Not because it is deficient, but because those who identify with it do not produce science” (page 183). He also writes about it through the narrator—who is none other than Hassan Aourid himself—in the novel Ribat Al-Mutanabbi (Arab Cultural Center, Casablanca, Beirut, first edition, 2019): “And I turned away from the Arabic language and the literature associated with it, for it neither puts food on the table nor shields one from want.” When Al-Mutanabbi, the novel’s protagonist, asked him: “Is the Arabic language therefore a burden?”, he replied: “It is very close to being one” (pages 23 and 24). Yet despite this acknowledgment of Arabic’s limitations as a scientific tongue, and this statement that it neither feeds a man nor keeps him from want—expressed within a fictional narrative—Professor Aourid harbors a genuine passion for the Arabic language, one evident to anyone who reads his essays and literary works. This passion shines through his mastery of the tongue and his encyclopedic grasp of its vocabulary, literature, history, heritage, grammar, and rhetoric. It is even more apparent in his Arabic writing style, which showcases all the grace, beauty, allure, and splendor of the language. This is demonstrated in his book For a Cultural Revolution in Morocco, whose perspective on Arabic we examine here. Although it is an intellectual essay rather than a work of creative fiction—and therefore relies on functional language, free of padding or superfluous prose, where each word carries precise meaning without serving mere decorative purpose—this functional prose under Professor Aourid’s pen remains beautiful, elegant, captivating, fluid, pliant, and natural. Reading it, one senses neither affectation nor strain in the choice of words and expressions. As noted, his encyclopedic mastery of the Arabic lexicon has enabled him, when context requires, to employ archaic and rarely used terms in a functional manner, thereby helping modernize, revitalize, and elevate the Arabic language. Within the scope of my own modest and longstanding knowledge, his writing evokes the innovative, distinctly revolutionary style of Taha Hussein and Gibran Khalil Gibran, both of whom skillfully combined functionality, beauty, and effortless grace. How fortunate the Arabic language is, then, to have a writer like Hassan Aourid!
Arabic between language and identity:
While Professor Aourid advocates teaching science in foreign languages (French, Spanish, and English), he simultaneously calls for nurturing the Arabic language, promoting it, and elevating its status. He writes: “We cannot neglect the Arabic language, and we must recognize its ability to rise; indeed, the responsibility incumbent upon us in our Morocco (the country) and across all the nations of the Maghreb, from Cyrenaica to Chinguetti, is to care for it when its own sons have disfigured it, its leaders have diminished it, and its people have scattered to the four winds” (page 183).
Why should we, as North Africans, look after the Arabic language when those who should be the first to protect and care for it have neglected and diminished it, as he puts it? We can glimpse the answer in the words of Professor Aourid: “The Arabic language has become a part of ourselves; we have produced through it in the various available sciences and Islamic jurisprudence, and we have created in the field of literature, even if we did not excel at it, because it was not our original language” (page 171). What does it mean that Arabic has become a part of ourselves? It means—even if Professor Aourid does not state it clearly and explicitly—that for us, Moroccans and North Africans in general, it has become the language of identity and belonging. Regarding this notion that Arabic is part of who we are, it is worth recalling that ever since it first arrived in the land of the Imazighen alongside Islam, this language had never been part of them, despite its religious status and sanctification as the very embodiment of the Quran and Islam. This is why this new status rooted in identity (“a part of ourselves”), which it holds among Moroccans today, stems first from the political Arabization of Morocco (its transformation into an Arab state) spearheaded by France from 1912 onward, and second from the ideological Arabization championed by the National Movement. This ideology was imposed, generalized, and disseminated through schools, the media, state policy, institutions, political parties, associations, and trade unions, to the point that Morocco’s “Arab” belonging has become an almost self-evident truth that no longer prompts questions or debate.
That Arabic is thus “part of us”—meaning that it constitutes a component of our identity—is therefore neither a natural given nor a historical fact: it is a manufactured and imposed construct that emerged in the 20th century and was entirely nonexistent prior to that. It stems from an all-encompassing Arabization—at once political, ethnic, identity-driven, ideological, and linguistic—established by the state as public policy backed by specific goals and colossal budgets. Consequently, in Morocco, the function of Arabic ceased to be merely linguistic, becoming instead an instrument of Arabization in terms of identity, whether one masters the language or knows nothing of it. It no longer serves to assimilate Arabic as a language, but rather to appropriate ethnic Arabness as an identity. Moreover, the constant reminder of the link between Arabic, the Quran, and Islam is nothing more than a means to this end: serving ethnic Arabness and cementing its hegemony.
This is why, if we maintain a culturally intimate relationship with heritage written in Arabic—a relationship that is absent, as Hassan Aourid writes, from our connection to Shakespeare when we master English, or even with French heritage despite the French language now being an integral part of our cultural fabric (page 173)—it is simply because English and French retain their natural status as languages in Morocco among those who use and command them, and even among those who write and create through them. By contrast, the status of Arabic in Morocco, whether one speaks it fluently or not, goes far beyond the linguistic framework to take on a dimension of identity that, as noted above, expresses Morocco’s “Arab” belonging. Thus, while the source of this intimate bond with Arabic heritage lies in the Arabic language through which it is expressed, this is not by virtue of its nature as a language, but rather as an identity and a marker of belonging—the product of the Arabizing ideology implemented by the state as official policy, as I have emphasized.
Furthermore, when Mr. Aourid asserts: “Tagore wrote in English without being English for all that; similarly, by writing in Arabic, I preserve my independence” (page 174)—meaning, in context, that writing in Arabic will not make him an Arab—this comparison does not hold up. Why? Because if Mr. Aourid, by writing in Arabic, preserves his individual Amazigh identity, this concerns him alone as an individual, much like Tagore, who preserved his Indian identity on a personal level while writing in English. Up to this point, the comparison is valid and acceptable. But the difference between Tagore, an English-language Indian writer, and Hassan Aourid, an Arabic-language Amazigh writer, lies in the fact that India as a whole preserves its collective identity independence (identity being a collective concept when referring to a people, a nation, a homeland, and a state), unlike Morocco, the author’s country, where the state acts as though it were an Arab country with a collective Arab identity. Consequently, it matters little that the use of Arabic by the Amazigh writer Hassan Aourid does not alter his personal sense of Amazigh belonging, since Arabic in Morocco is instrumentalized as a manifestation of the country’s Arabness. This confirms the special status conferred on Arabic, which is understood as an identity and an Arabness rather than a mere language, unlike French in Morocco or English in India.
Arabic, heritage, and the sacred:
Among the arguments put forward by Mr. Aourid to justify the attention given to Arabic, as well as its teaching and study, is the claim that this language holds a rich heritage accessible only through its mastery. In this regard, he cites numerous examples borrowed from this legacy—poetry, prose, thought, philosophy, Islamic jurisprudence, and more—from different periods of its history (page 172). He then adds that this tradition must be subjected to a critical reading, and that we are by no means obligated to teach all of it, but rather to select its “luminous” aspects while setting aside the rest (page 173). The question then arises: by what criteria do we distinguish between what is luminous and what is obscure in this heritage? Have not organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS built themselves upon what their followers precisely consider to be the “luminous” aspects of this tradition? Do not Islamist extremists justify the acts of terrorism they advocate by claiming to revive these “luminous” parts of this heritage? Do they not consider “jihad,” through which they legitimize these acts, to be one of the most “luminous” concepts of this heritage?
The most dangerous aspect of this heritage is that its “backward” religious dimension takes precedence over its creative and luminous intellectual side. This is why the influence of Ibn Taymiyya and Al-Bukhari on minds, for instance, proves much stronger than that of Al-Ma’arri’s poetry, Averroes’s thought, or Ibn Khaldun’s theory on human society. The association of Arabic with ethnic Arabism and religious sacredness inevitably leads to the sacralization of the language and its heritage, creating a triple confusion between the Arabic language, Islam, and ethnic Arab identity. It is easy to understand, then, why Arabic has remained a heritage language—archaic and museum-bound: the yoke of the sacred shackles it, preventing it from evolving, renewing itself, and establishing itself as a living language attuned to its time. To be convinced of this, one need only recall that the main argument used by proponents of Arabization to demonstrate the superiority and uniqueness of Arabic is not that it is a language of science, economics, or technology, but rather their tireless repetition that it is the language of the Quran. That is why it is entirely natural that the few advances the Arabic language experienced starting in the second half of the 19th century were the work of Arab Christians. Why? Because, being Christian, they viewed and treated Arabic as an ordinary language, devoid of any sacred character. Such is the dilemma of the Arabic language: to be a “free,” “light,” and “dynamic” language capable of easily absorbing novelty and progress, it must be unshackled from the sacred that weighs it down and keeps it in a state of sclerosis and powerlessness. Yet freeing it from the sacred would cause it to lose what its defenders view as transcendence and an exclusive privilege over other tongues—a privilege derived solely from its connection to the religious sacred—relegating it to the rank of a language with no added value or special prestige compared to any other.
That is why, although Mr. Aourid displays boldness and a revolutionary spirit (the book’s central theme being precisely cultural revolution) when he calls for civil education—a term he chooses to avoid the controversial label “secular”—with no place whatsoever for Islamic education, declaring: “We do not want public schools to be a platform for the political exploitation of religion, nor a setting for religious indoctrination” (page 100), and: “In the school to which I aspire, I cannot conceive of the existence of something called Islamic education” (page 104), such an education ultimately proves incompatible with maintaining Arabic as the medium of instruction for literary subjects. Why? Because Arabic, as we have explained, is a language inseparable from Islam and the sacred realm of religion. Using Arabic—perceived as an intrinsic component of Islam—for an education detached from Islam is therefore paradoxical. The prerequisite for a civil, non-religious education is either to adopt a non-religious language—which can only be a language other than Arabic, whether foreign languages, the Amazigh language, or Darija—or to use Arabic on the explicit condition that the student belongs to a non-Muslim family, such as a Christian one. Indeed, by virtue of its status and history, Arabic cannot be detached from Islam. This explains why some teachers turn natural science classes taught in Arabic into lessons on the “scientific miracles of the Quran,” something they refrain from doing when teaching the same subject in another language. This unique status of Arabic as a language inseparable from Islam explains why secularism emerged among Arab Christians rather than Muslims. Furthermore, if European societies were the first to embrace secularism, it is because they began discarding the language of religion—Latin—more than five centuries ago.
The true purpose of Arabization is to Arabize the individual, not the language:
Since Arabic cannot be detached from tradition, Islam, or Arabism—being itself that tradition, that Islam, and that Arabism, with these three dimensions constituting its very essence—Arabization extends far beyond the strictly linguistic realm. In the words of Arabization proponents themselves, it becomes the Arabization of the human being and their environment as the ultimate goal, rather than the Arabization of the language, which serves merely as a tool. Consequently, the failure of the Arabization policy within the education system was entirely predictable: the objective of this policy was never academic Arabization focusing on language, but rather the Arabization of the human being, transforming them into an Arab individual even if they understand nothing of the Arabic language. Measured against this true objective, Arabization has achieved a degree of success that far exceeds all expectations: Moroccans have become more Arab and more zealous in championing Arab causes than Arabs themselves.
When Hassan Aourid writes, “Should we therefore [alluding to the failure of Arabization] place the blame on the Arabic language? Objectivity requires distinguishing between the Arabic language and the manner in which Arabization was carried out” (page 166), he understands and implicitly acknowledges that Arabization, as implemented, has nothing to do with language as a medium. Its goal was entirely different: to Arabize the individual and their environment rather than their language, as I have just demonstrated.
But could there be another way to carry out Arabization without Arabizing the individual and their environment, as proponents of this process advocate? If Arabic were an ordinary language subject to the same dynamics as others, like French, it would certainly be possible to implement Arabization in a way that limits itself to Arabizing the language used in schools without altering the individual or their social milieu. This is precisely the case with French, whose instruction and educational use do not lead to the cultural or identity-based Francization of Moroccan citizens or their environment. Yet such a separation is strictly impossible with Arabic. In Morocco, it is unthinkable to practice Arabization in any way other than how it has been executed, because Arabic, unlike French or other tongues, is deeply interwoven with heritage, religious sanctity, and pan-Arab belonging. Consequently, Arabization subjects its Moroccan targets to this sacred realm, to this heritage, and above all to this identity alignment, which constitutes the true goal of the process. Therefore, asserting that the Arabic language has nothing to do with the failure of Arabization—as its zealots endlessly repeat—is exactly like claiming that Islamic heritage is entirely divorced from religious extremism and jihadist movements, as defenders of that heritage likewise love to harp on.
A language half alive or half dead:
Given Arabic’s status as a language inseparable from heritage, religious sacredness, and pan-Arab identity, as I have pointed out, the appropriate approach in such a situation would be to teach it—owing to its religious and heritage status—as a mere subject rather than a medium of instruction. Even non-scientific disciplines, such as philosophy and history, should be taught in a language other than Arabic, and not just the sciences as Mr. Aourid advocates. Indeed, the problem with Arabic lies not only in the fact that it is not a language of science; its major handicap is that it has lost its functional role in daily communication. It has thus become an exclusively written language, which even those who master it in writing never use in their spoken exchanges. Arabic has thereby lost the primary condition that makes a speech form a living language: its effective use as a medium of communication in everyday life. It survives solely through writing. This makes it an impaired language—half alive or half dead—inasmuch as a language fundamentally and primarily lives through oral use, and secondarily through written practice.
The problem is that an impaired language that is not spoken in daily life, such as Arabic, transfers its own handicap to the student when it serves as the foundational language of instruction through which they acquire the thought mechanisms needed to assimilate knowledge and skills. This is one of the primary reasons crippling Morocco’s education system, as it relies on an impaired language for students’ foundational training. Indeed, using a language that is not spoken in everyday life as the primary medium of teaching and learning transforms the mastery of that language into the ultimate goal of education, to the detriment of acquiring knowledge, ideas, science, and skills. Consequently, the means—namely language—becomes an end in itself, overshadowing the true purpose of education: the acquisition of knowledge, ideas, sciences, and skills.
Is the situation of Arabic comparable to that of Mandarin?
In his critique of those advocating for the adoption of Darija as the medium of instruction—arguant that it is a living, everyday spoken language fit to replace Arabic, which is absent from such exchanges—Mr. Aourid brings up the example of Chinese Mandarin. He writes: “We can […] cite the counter-example of China, which possesses a unified language, Mandarin, understood by educated people, without its elitist character preventing the rise of science or hindering China from becoming an inescapable economic, technological, and military power” (page 167).
In reality, the example of Chinese Mandarin proves the exact opposite of what Mr. Aourid attempts to demonstrate—namely his assumption that an elitist language, purely scholastic and excluded from daily oral communication, such as Arabic, could become a vehicle for science, the economy, and technology in the manner of Mandarin. Yet, the situation of Mandarin is radically different from that of Arabic. While Mandarin was indeed imposed on all Chinese people as a unified idiom—much like Arabic in Morocco—including a majority for whom it was not the daily mother tongue, it nevertheless originally existed as a native language and daily medium of communication for the inhabitants of northern and parts of central China {Chinese (civilization), Encyclopædia Universalis}. This is why its political and pedagogical imposition allowed for its adoption, after two or more generations, as a mother tongue and daily language of interaction, even in regions that previously used other dialects as their native and everyday languages. This is explained by the fact that it is a living language, genuinely spoken and practiced in communication, capable of being learned at home, in the street, at the market, or in the factory. This observation applies to all living languages in use, such as English and Spanish, which became the everyday languages of communication for millions of Indigenous peoples (“Native Americans”) across the Americas, even though, prior to the imposition of English and Spanish, they spoke their original local idioms. Similarly, today there are Moroccan families who use French as their daily language of communication, to the point that their children acquire it as a mother tongue.
As for Arabic, it was not the language of daily use and communication in any region of Morocco—nor, for that matter, in any region of the world—before being imposed on all Moroccans and all regions of the Kingdom, much like Mandarin. Consequently, it will never become a living language of daily communication, whether in Morocco or in any other country in the world. It remains a written language, acquired in school or similar settings, completely absent from daily oral exchanges. From this perspective—that of a minority language originating from a specific region and imposed on the majority as a common idiom—any comparison between Mandarin and Arabic is therefore unfounded.
On the other hand, even if this aspect is not of paramount importance, one must not overlook the fact that Mandarin, even if it was not originally the language of all Chinese provinces or all Chinese people, is nonetheless an authentically Chinese language: it was historically born in China and spoken by Chinese people in Chinese regions (in the north and center of the country). This historical rooting naturally facilitated its adoption as a unifying and common language, even though this adoption was initially coercive, imposed from above for political and educational imperatives. Arabic, by contrast, is neither a Moroccan language nor a national language: it did not emerge historically in Morocco and does not belong to its native soil; it is an alien language that arrived from beyond North Africa. Here again, any parallel drawn between Mandarin and Arabic collapses in the face of such a fundamental divergence.
Arabic and Classical Chinese:
In reality, the form of Chinese that truly lends itself to a comparison with Arabic, because of their deep functional and usage similarities, is what is known in China as the “written language.” It bears this name because it is reserved exclusively for writing, is used solely for that purpose, and has never existed as a spoken language or medium of oral communication. It thus maintained this exclusive scriptural function for twenty centuries, without its status or its strictly written role ever changing (Encyclopædia Universalis). Yet this Chinese language hardly differs from Arabic, with which it shares several major characteristics:
– It is a language exclusively reserved for writing, just like Arabic;
– Learning it requires a very long time, like Arabic;
– As a result, it constitutes, like Arabic, an elitist language that only educated individuals can read and write, given that it is never used in daily oral communication;
– It is an archaic and heritage language that has remained unchanged for two millennia, just like Arabic, which is also archaic, heritage, and religious, and has remained frozen in the same form for fifteen centuries.
The essential difference between this Chinese language—archaic, heritage-based, frozen, and reserved for writing—and the Arabic language, which shares these same traits, lies in the fact that the Chinese did not achieve their current level of progress, knowledge, technology, and economic prosperity through this ancient, frozen written language. They achieved it thanks to their second modern language, Mandarin, which was originally merely a vernacular spoken in northern China and certain central provinces, as I noted earlier. The Chinese standardized it as a unified, common language so that it became the language of writing, schooling, the press, science, and the economy, while simultaneously preserving its primary function as an everyday medium of communication and exchange. This is the exact opposite of the classical Chinese written language, which was disconnected from living reality since it was never used in speech or ordinary exchanges.
The situation in Morocco that could have been compared to that of Mandarin is therefore by no means that of the Arabic language—which resembles ancient Chinese, archaic, heritage-based, frozen, and strictly scriptural, with no connection whatsoever to Mandarin. Rather, it would be a scenario where the Darija of Oujda, Marrakech, or the Jbala region, for instance, were imposed on all Moroccans as a unified, common language for writing, education, schooling, and administration; or a scenario where the Amazigh language of Souss, the Rif, Figuig, or Ait Iznassen, for instance, were imposed on all Moroccans as a standardized, unifying language used in writing, education, schooling, and administration…
Is a cultural revolution conceivable without a linguistic revolution?
As its title suggests, the book Pour une révolution culturelle au Maroc [For a Cultural Revolution in Morocco] deals with the conditions necessary to achieve a revolution in culture. Here, culture is understood in its narrow and common academic sense—namely, thought and knowledge—in the sense that a person is said to be “cultured,” meaning educated and intellectual. A cultural revolution, according to the book’s definition, thus proves to be a revolution of thought and knowledge. However, since language is the instrument for expressing thought and knowledge, any cultural revolution—understood as an intellectual and cognitive revolution—must necessarily be preceded, both as a prerequisite and as a tool, by a linguistic revolution. This is not merely a matter of developing and modernizing the existing language, or simplifying it to make it easier to use, as many education sector stakeholders advocate. Such measures are merely simple reforms and have nothing to do with a genuine revolution. It is precisely these reforms that the author criticizes when he writes: “The reforms adopted could not elevate our education system; they have only worsened the situation and run up against what the philosopher Gaston Bachelard calls epistemological obstacles. A clean break is imperatively required” (page 223).
If one applies Bachelard’s concept of an “epistemological obstacle,” it becomes clear that the Arabic language constitutes a true “epistemological obstacle.” Indeed, its use as a primary and fundamental language—even if it were not used to teach the sciences—prevents us from:
— Realizing that our collective identity as Moroccans and North Africans in general is not Arab. As we have already pointed out, the Arabic language is an identity marker inseparable from Arabness in its ethnic and identity sense; its function thus goes beyond a simple linguistic framework to transform into pan-Arab belonging.
— Thinking scientifically, not only because Arabic does not produce science, as Hassan Aourid asserts, but also because it is a language of religion and heritage tradition. By virtue of the inherent link uniting language and thought, it directs reflection toward metaphysical questions and “dead” subjects belonging to the past.
— Realizing that the Arabic language constitutes a hindrance and a burden, owing to its attachment to the sacred in religion and the belief that God chose it to address humanity—making it, according to this faith, the most perfect, sacred, and superior of all languages. This sacralization prevents any prospect of moving beyond it and forbids questioning its almost automatic status as the primary and main language.
Consequently, the “rupture,” still in the Bachelardian sense, lies in breaking with the Arabic language itself by abandoning its status as the primary and essential language to replace it with other tongues. This is a rupture that goes far beyond a mere rollback of Arabization, as it implies a practical and radical questioning of the linguistic situation in Morocco as well as our perception of it. This is why teaching in foreign languages instead of Arabic is not enough to achieve such a linguistic break. The true rupture will occur when the Amazigh language and Darija are equipped and prepared to become the languages of identity, knowledge, and schooling. Yet this is precisely what Hassan Aourid rejects, under the pretext that Arabic cannot be equated with Latin (page 167)—which was nonetheless replaced, starting in the 16th century, by new and emerging national languages.
To the question “What do we want?”, Hassan Aourid answers: “We want to take part in the universal experience and assimilate its achievements,” referring thereby to Western civilization, with its rationality, science, democracy, and freedoms. He specifies: “It is not enough to dress like them [Westerners] and use their technologies… That is not enough; our minds must necessarily absorb the same mindset as Westerners, not because they are Westerners, but because they carry the torch of universal civilization” (page 25).
If the ultimate goal of the cultural revolution advocated in Hassan Aourid’s book is to eventually achieve the level of science, progress, prosperity, freedom, democracy, and justice attained by the West, there is no other way to accomplish this than by making the same break that Europeans made from the 15th century onward to pave their way toward that result. This break consisted of abandoning Latin as the primary and foundational language in favor of their own popular and national languages, or expanding one of their dialects into a national and state language for writing and instruction. Emancipating themselves from Latin freed them from an “epistemological obstacle” that hindered new ways of thinking about nature, humanity, society, and religion. If Western Europe experienced profound political, intellectual, scientific, and economic transformations from the dawn of the Renaissance, it was thanks to liberating reason from the yoke and chains of Latin, which had confined it to the realm of the unseen, tradition, and religious sanctity. Consequently, if we wish to follow the Western path as Hassan Aourid advocates, we must inevitably follow their example by breaking with the Arabic language, whose status, function, and shortcomings mirror in every respect those of Latin before it was abandoned in favor of living local vernaculars elevated to national languages used for writing, education, literary creation, and administration.
As for the claim that the case of the Arabic language cannot be compared to that of Latin, it perfectly illustrates the very “epistemological obstacle” that Arabic embodies: the mere notion that the Amazigh language and Darija could become languages of instruction, thought, knowledge, power, and administration in Morocco is rendered unthinkable, cast outside the boundaries of debate. In reality, the very idea of abandoning Arabic is dismissed outright because we analyze it through the logic of the Arabic language itself and from within it—that is, from the perspective of the “epistemological obstacle” inherent to Arabic, one of whose functions is precisely to prevent such reflection. While relinquishing Arabic would admittedly cause trauma, this is because “the break can only be a shock” (page 299), as Hassan Aourid himself acknowledges. He appears conscious of the linguistic stakes and the “epistemological obstacle” represented by Arabic. However, although he demonstrated boldness and clarity in advocating for teaching science in a foreign language and opting for a secular curriculum free of Islamic religious education, he nevertheless seems to have attempted to hedge his bets, bowing to “political correctness” without carrying the revolution he champions to its logical conclusion—a revolution against the Arabic language. This ultimately led him to treat Arabic as an integral part of our identity and to call for its preservation and care.
Arabic version | French version

Mohamed Boudhan was an Amazigh writer, thinker, researcher and activist from the Rif, and publisher of the newspaper Tawiza. He was the author of many valuable books and articles on Amazigh identity. May he rest in peace.