Mohamed Boudhan | The Identity Dimension of Development
Ever since the King called for the creation of a new development model in his speech opening the parliamentary session on October 13, 2017, theoretical debate has continued over the model’s nature, foundations, priorities, and objectives. Following the appointment on December 12, 2019, of the commission tasked with formulating and drafting this new development model, the discussion shifted from theory to practice, focusing on its operational implementation.
It is well known that a development model cannot be reduced to a mere “technical” operation that simply needs to be carried out according to the standard procedures required for such tasks to ensure success, much like constructing a bridge, a building, or a dam, or repairing a car engine. That is why, even when the economic, financial, and technical resources, along with all the material equipment belonging to what is called infrastructure—indispensable to any development project—are tangibly, visibly, and even measurably present, there are other “resources” that are neither material nor visible, yet whose role can prove decisive in the success or failure of the project in question. This refers to the superstructure, in the Marxist sense of the term, which relates to the ideological aspects of the state that govern its general policy as well as its vision of development, its means, and its goals. The best example of this is that planning a development model within a socialist system is not the same as planning that same model within a capitalist system, even when both plans mobilize the same economic and financial resources and use the same material and technical equipment.
Among the ideological aspects of the state are its language and identity, along with the culture associated with them in the broad anthropological sense, its historical heroes—whether real or mythical—and the glorification of past events, whether real or invented. What, then, is the link between this ideological aspect and development, and how does it influence it?
Human beings, the primary resource of development:
True development aims to help human beings flourish and to train them to be the architects of development and its primary resource, ahead of natural and economic resources. The “shaping” and training of human beings depend on a clear conception of the type of individual one wishes to “manufacture” and form, and this conception stems from specific ideological convictions about the desired person. For example, wanting an anti-Jewish individual requires instilling antisemitism in people’s minds, as Nazi ideology did. Wanting an anti-communist requires spreading and entrenching the idea that communism is a danger threatening humanity, as the United States did during the Cold War. Wanting an extremist Wahhabi Muslim requires religious instruction centered on the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya, while wanting a fierce warrior demands paramilitary education and training in the arts of combat and war. Wanting an individual hostile to Amazigh identity entails prioritizing the lie of the “Berber Dahir” in training. By contrast, wanting an innovative scientist requires an education that develops the use of reason and experimental observation, alongside creating more laboratories and scientific training institutes. Wanting an individual who believes in the occult, superstitions, and sorcery requires promoting and entrenching the “virtues” of sharia ruqyah and the “medical” benefits of camel urine. And wanting an individual with racist tendencies who regards their supposed race as superior and supreme is achieved through training that spreads the false, superstitious belief that they descend from a “noble lineage” (Sharifian). Once all of this is understood, it becomes clear that the ideology adopted by the state—and which it works to disseminate through schools, the media, mosques, and the administration—has a direct impact on development. Indeed, it is this ideology that sets the aims and priorities of that development, which in turn determines the appropriate qualifications for the person best suited to those goals and priorities.
Why did the previous development model fail?
The call to draft a new development model amounts to an explicit admission that the previous model failed. Why, then, did that model fail? Beyond corruption—a factor behind the failure of all development projects in Morocco (see the article “Why Will the New Development Model Fail?” in the book “Qadaya Maghribiya” on the Tawiza website)—there is the ideological factor mentioned in the previous paragraph, which plays a major role in their failure. As explained earlier, this concerns the kind of citizen the state seeks to shape and equip to serve as the engine of development. And because the Moroccan state rests on the ideology of Arabism and Islam, all of its development projects have been designed and implemented to foster Arabness and Islam among Moroccan citizens. While the latest Constitution, adopted in 2011, no longer stipulates Morocco’s Arab affiliation—unlike the 1992 and 1996 constitutions, which declared Morocco “part of the Greater Arab Maghreb”—this does not mean the state has stopped claiming that Arab affiliation. What truly matters lies not in constitutional and legal texts, but in the state’s overarching policy—including school curricula, language choices, diplomatic action, and the positions and statements of officials representing the state. This policy is pursued on the basis of the Moroccan state’s purported Arab identity and affiliation. As for Islam in Morocco, it has moved beyond its religious role to take on an identity function comparable to that of Arabness, as stated in the preamble to the 2011 Constitution, which affirms that “Moroccan identity is characterized by the preeminence accorded to the Islamic religion.” As the religion of the state (Article 3 of the Constitution), it is a quintessential political Islam, tied to an eminently political institution: the state.
In reality, the state’s ideology—namely Arabism and political Islam—shapes the goals and priorities of its development policy. This explains why development projects, regardless of their form or content, always pursue the same objective: to mold an Arab and Muslim citizen who is devoted body and soul to Arabism and its associated political Islam (is Islam not routinely paired with Arabism in the standard phrase “Arabism and Islam”?), while preparing that citizen to defend them both. The aim is by no means to cultivate a citizen equipped with scientific skills, useful knowledge, and practical know-how—someone capable of innovating and creating, able to confront life’s challenges and devise solutions grounded in reason, logic, and science rather than superstitious, metaphysical, or religious thinking.
Developing Arabism and political Islam at the expense of human development:
The failure of previous development models is therefore rooted in their inability to cultivate the human resources essential and suited for genuine growth. By contrast, these models were entirely successful in achieving their actual objectives: promoting Arabism and political Islam. This is evidenced by the hegemony of ethnic and nationalist Arabism in Morocco and the unprecedented rise of political Islam—manifested in the spread of religious extremism, the emergence of terrorist cells, and the ascension of political Islamists to the head of government and public administration. This resounding success in promoting Arabism and political Islam stands in stark contrast to the bitter failure of true development, which requires science, knowledge, reason, and logic, rather than ethnicity and mysticism. Consequently, as Arabism and political Islam advance in Morocco, development regresses, dragging the country down to the bottom of global rankings in progress and human development—even though, as recently as 1980, Morocco was five times wealthier than China (see the article: “No point in stopping linguistic Arabization without stopping identity Arabization“). It is hardly surprising, then, to see Morocco trailing behind African nations it once outpaced in the recent past, such as Senegal, Kenya, and Rwanda.
Why has Morocco fallen behind countries it outperformed only recently? Because the ideology adopted by the state—or imposed upon it by France, its protecting power, starting in 1912—led it to reduce development to nothing more than the promotion of Arabism and political Islam, as I have written. In this realm, success exceeded all expectations. Thus, the only “development” that achieved resounding success in Morocco was the identity transformation of Moroccans, shifting their belonging from an African Amazigh identity to an Asian Arab identity—namely, the process of Arabization. This process was accompanied by, and heavily contributed to, the growth of political Islam, which is merely the flip side of Arabization and this broader identity shift. As a result, genuine economic, social, and political development (including the democratization of governance) failed, because absolute priority was given to advancing Arabism and political Islam.
Conditions for the success of the new development model:
Now that we know the ideological causes behind the failure of previous development models, we can design a model that avoids these pitfalls by eliminating the factors that caused those failures. For the new development model to succeed, this requires a clean break from promoting political Islam and the ethnic and ideological Arabism that framed earlier projects. It follows that instead of seeking to “manufacture” an Arabist and Muslim individual inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood—a mere instrument for promoting ethno-ideological Arabism and its political Islam—development efforts must aim to “shape” a true Moroccan citizen who will drive genuinely Moroccan development. This is precisely what the King called for in his speech of August 20, 2019, when he stressed the need to craft a “100% Moroccan-Moroccan model.” Yet what does a purely Moroccan-Moroccan development model mean? Starting from the principle that human beings are the primary resource for development, it means shaping a purely Moroccan-Moroccan citizen. And what does shaping such a citizen mean? It means molding an individual in line with who they truly are, in harmony with their identity rooted in their North African land: a collective Amazigh identity that makes them Amazigh and African, and not Arab as people have tried to make them believe since 1912. I want to make clear that when I say “and not Arab,” this stems from no hostility toward Arabness. Arabness in its original homeland, among the Arab peoples of the Gulf countries, enjoys our full consideration and respect, and we have no quarrel with it. Our objection is directed solely at the borrowed and artificial Arabism in Morocco, because it constitutes a falsification, a lie, and a distortion of identity contrary to truth, morality, religion, and nature. Arabs themselves do not recognize the Arabness of North African countries and reject their affiliation.
Thus, shaping a purely Moroccan-Moroccan citizen is the prerequisite for achieving genuinely Moroccan-Moroccan development. Such a citizen will have as their sole concern the development of their country and homeland, in service of their collective Amazigh identity, rather than serving the identity shift and fueling Arab causes and identity, which have their own defenders to take care of them.
The Development Model Commission:
When examining the composition of the Special Commission on the Development Model, with its chairman and thirty-five members appointed by the king on December 12, 2019, it is clear that it includes not a single Amazigh member. By this, I do not mean that it lacks people who speak the Amazigh language or come from Amazigh families, but rather that it is devoid of members who are conscious of and committed to Morocco’s collective Amazigh identity. This gives cause for pessimism regarding the nature of the development model the commission will propose, and suggests that it will bring nothing new to its vision of tomorrow’s citizen—the very person who will be trained to produce and drive development. The absence of the Amazigh element, in the sense I have just explained, within this commission is an indicator that it will draft its development model without changing its conception of the human being of the future. That citizen risks remaining the same as yesterday’s: this “transgender” being in terms of nation and identity, harboring a false and deceptive awareness of their true belonging. It is this very individual who caused previous development models to fail. They were prepared not to be able to develop the country’s economy and generate wealth through the knowledge, skills, and qualifications they should have acquired, but rather to become a Muslim Brotherhood Arabo-Islamist and a Wahhabi, ready to blow themselves up not to defend their homeland’s causes, but for Arabism and its political Islam.
The fact that most members of the commission belong to the Francophone current in no way means that it is not pan-Arabist in the ideology and convictions of its members. Quite the contrary, the predominant presence of the Francophone current within it is proof of its pan-Arabist orientation, which is hostile to Amazigh identity. Why? Because Francophonie, as Morocco’s contemporary history proves, has been a strategic ally of Arabism in Morocco ever since the French military intervention of 1912 to protect that Arabism, as everyone knows. Since that date, France, along with the Francophone ideology tied to it, has been the foremost historical enemy of Amazigh identity and the Amazigh people. That is why Arabization was accomplished through French before being realized through Arabic, with Francophonie being merely the other side of Arabization in Morocco (see the article: “Arabization Succeeded First Through French Before Reaching Fruition Through Arabic” in the book On Arabic, Darija, and Identity Sex Change on the Tawiza website). Professor Hassan Aourid has also thoroughly demonstrated the role of Moroccan Francophones in supporting corruption and authoritarianism, despite their modern education and high cultural level (see the article: “The Scourge of the Francophones in the Book: ‘For a Cultural Revolution in Morocco’” in the book Moroccan Issues on the Tawiza website).
In conclusion, the makeup of the commission does not suggest that the model it proposes will be “purely Moroccan-Moroccan,” as the king nevertheless stated in his speech. Rather, it indicates that this model will scarcely differ from previous ones unless its foundations include liberating Morocco from all dependence on Arabism, both in terms of identity and religion. This requires calling for the construction of a new Morocco, grounded in its collective Amazigh identity and its Moroccan Islam, as Moroccans practiced it before the epidemic of Muslim Brotherhood ideology and Wahhabism arrived from the Middle East.
Identity and Islam cannot be regarded as a purely ideological subject unrelated to the question of the development model—unless one conceives of development as mere technical measures aimed at short-term achievements lasting no more than five years, for example. In that case, it is no longer development, but simply “growth” (Croissance). And there is a world of difference between the two. Indeed, as explained earlier, development is not about material and technical achievements confined to a given period; rather, it consists of educating and equipping human beings so that they become capable of being the architects of development themselves. Consequently, it is clear that the nature of the identity and the type of Islam (the currents and doctrines) to which an individual adheres directly influence the nature of the development they produce. When their identity is Arab and their Islam is based on Muslim Brotherhood ideology or Wahhabism, development to them means the expansion of that Arabism and that Islam. It is precisely this kind of “development” that has caused genuine development to fail in Morocco and that lies behind the call to formulate a new development model, as has been noted.
Arabic version | French version

Mohamed Boudhan was an Amazigh writer, thinker, researcher and activist from the Rif, and publisher of the newspaper Tawiza. He was the author of many valuable books and articles on Amazigh identity. May he rest in peace.