Were the Amazigh Truly the First to Abolish the Death Penalty?
In the wake of the “trend” of calls by human rights defenders to abolish the death penalty from the Moroccan Penal Code—a punishment they consider barbaric, archaic, and an infringement on the sacred right to life—Amazigh activists have seized upon this demand to boast that the Imazighen were allegedly the first to abolish this penalty. According to them, capital punishment is contrary to Amazigh customs, which are based on the veneration of life as a supreme value and respect for human beings as such. They add that the Imazighen also lacked a prison system to detain offenders as punishment for criminal acts. In cases of intentional homicide, the maximum sanction imposed was thus exile or banishment from the community, with neither imprisonment nor capital punishment existing.
The Absence of Capital Punishment: A Consequence of the Lack of a State Institution
While it is true that the Imazighen practiced neither capital punishment nor imprisonment among the sanctions established by their customary laws, this was by no means due to a human rights breakthrough stemming from a reverence for life and freedom as supreme values—intangible regardless of the crimes committed by the offender—as many Amazigh activists attempt to convince us. It is explained quite simply by the absence of the state as an institution indispensable for carrying out these two forms of punishment: the deprivation of life and the deprivation of liberty. Why the state?
Because all other forms of authority—outside of those organized as a state—in whose name disputes are settled and justice is administered, such as the authority of the tribe or the tribal confederation, which among the Imazighen rested on elective and democratic legitimacy, remain personal in character. They stay attached more to the individuals who exercise them than to the institutional role conferring that authority, even when this exercise of power derives its legitimacy from the community (the jemaa, the tribe, etc.) and is not carried out in the name of the executing individual. In contrast, state power—even when exercised in the name and on behalf of a prince, chieftain, commander, ruler, or victorious conqueror, and even when that state takes a primary or rudimentary form—remains more closely tied to the office than to the individual occupying it. The difference between state authority and tribal authority therefore lies not in the intrinsic nature of power itself as personal or abstract, but in the nature of the social and political organization in whose name that power is exercised.
In short, power within a tribal organization, for instance, is less abstract and more personalized than within a state organization, where it leans toward abstraction and independence from personal identity.
Unlike the Tribe, the State Possesses Regular Armed Forces
This distinction is clearly reflected in the fact that a state possesses a standing security force (such as an army, guard, or police) that protects it externally and maintains internal order—even if that force were composed of mercenaries, bandits, or a criminal gang, which is precisely how the state historically emerged according to the force theory of state formation. What matters is not the nature of the individuals comprising this force, but rather its function: its capacity, as an organized force, to suppress, deter, punish, and compel. By contrast, tribal organization—no matter how advanced it may be in maintaining public safety and applying customary law—lacks a standing security force, even if it commands something akin to an army to defend the tribe when subjected to external attack. Those who rise up to defend the tribe and repel aggressors or invaders do not constitute a standing defense force—and I emphasize “standing”—because they are performing a voluntary, non-professional act without compensation. This remains true even if their defense is more effective than what a professional standing army could have achieved, and even if their skill, prowess, and bravery surpass those of paid mercenaries or career soldiers. What matters here is neither the outcome, nor victory, nor skill, nor bravery, but the presence of a “standing” institution, with all that it implies in terms of carrying out the professional duties of a soldier, guard, or police officer as a gainful occupation. Unlike members of a state’s standing security forces, who continue to carry out their defense and security duties even in the absence of war, conflict, rebellion, or instability, the defense and security role of tribal members ends as soon as the reasons for their mobilization cease—such as after an external attack—at which point they return to their customary livelihoods, such as livestock farming, agriculture, trade, or craftsmanship.
Through these clarifications, I aim to show that the absence of the death penalty among the Imazighen is entirely natural given the nature of the tribal system. In such a framework, executing a capital sentence is fundamentally impossible: executing a convict would amount to a direct attempt on their life and would expose the executioner to blood feuds and retaliation, given the absence of a deterrent, enforceable public authority capable of compelling everyone to respect the verdict and its execution, as exists under a state system. To avoid such conflicts, the solution was to resort to banishment.
The absence of prisons: another consequence of the stateless society
The same can be said of the absence of penal institutions among the Imazighen. Establishing and maintaining a prison system requires indispensable and rigid conditions that must be sustained on a permanent, ongoing basis: detention facilities, guards, food, a sufficient budget, and so forth. None of this can be guaranteed within a tribal organization, where collective (or what would today be called public) tasks rely on volunteer work and community solidarity—such as maintaining mosques, providing food for those who tend to them, digging and maintaining wells, or clearing and building roads. Voluntary effort and community solidarity alone could never suffice to construct and manage prisons, incarcerate criminals, or carry out the death penalty.
This explains why banishment was widespread before the French protectorate among tribes beyond the authority of the Makhzen, whereas it was virtually non-existent among those under its influence, as the Makhzen state maintained places of detention and applied the death penalty. In this regard, it is worth noting that the Rif tribes—who had no concept of prisons and routinely practiced banishment precisely because they operated outside the authority of the Makhzen state—abandoned this punitive system and established places of detention as soon as Mohammed Ben Abdelkrim Al Khattabi founded a state (the Republic of the Rif), complete with a government, institutions, and laws.
The practice of secularism, also a result of the absence of a state:
The exact same logic applies to secularism, which Amazigh activists frequently claim Imazighen practiced in their social life. As evidence, they point to the clear boundary maintained between the religious realm and political decision-making concerning the tribe. Religious figures (such as the fqih, preacher, or imam) did not intervene in the political decisions of the tribe, which fell exclusively within the purview of its elected council. Furthermore, these decisions were made independently of religious doctrine, focusing solely on the community’s general interest without concern for whether they aligned with or contradicted religious precepts. What holds true for the absence of the death penalty and prisons among Imazighen—which is explained by the absence of state institutions—applies equally to this “Amazigh secularism.” Just as the absence of a state accounts for the non-existence of prisons and capital punishment in pre-protectorate Amazigh societies, this “Amazigh secularism” is likewise the product of that very same absence of state power. After all, secularism is constantly defined as the separation of religion and the state. Consequently, where there is no state, it makes no sense to speak of secularism—that is, the separation of religion from something that does not exist.
Before the emergence of the state, religiosity could only ever be “secular” by nature, even when it assumed a collective form, such as temples where believers gathered to perform rituals together. Why? Because there was no authority with the scale and power of a state to impose a single, politically expedient religion onto everyone through coercion, deterrence, punishment, compulsion, incentives, and intimidation. Thus, in pre-state societies, religious practice—despite the binding nature of local customs—remained free from true systemic coercion, namely that backed by state authority and force. Practicing religion without compulsion is tantamount to religious freedom, which forms the very essence of secularism. This religious freedom hinges either on the existence of a secular state or on the total absence of a state, as was true of tribally organized societies like Amazigh society prior to the French protectorate. It is no coincidence that religion in most pre-state societies was polytheistic—defined by belief in multiple deities and diverse modes of worship (what Islam would later term shirk, or associationism). This plurality implied the freedom to choose among multiple gods, which effectively meant the freedom to choose among different religions. And as previously noted, this “religious” freedom lies at the very heart of secularism.
This is why the claim made by certain Amazigh activists that the Imazighen practiced religion in a “secular” manner—even before the concept of secularism emerged—actually reflects a common practice among all peoples who had not developed a state apparatus. If the Imazighen remained “secular” even after converting to Islam, it was because they preserved their tribal organization and their independence from the state, with the exception of those tribes subjected to the central authority of the Makhzen, as previously noted.
The key, therefore, lies in the absence of a state system:
It is therefore evident that the absence of the death penalty among the Imazighen—much like the absence of detention centers for criminals and the practice of a “secular” form of religion—did not reflect an advanced human rights consciousness grounded in respect for the right to life, contrary to the assertions of many members of the Amazigh movement. Rather, it reflected a lower level of social organization that had not yet reached the stage of statehood. This is why banishment, used as an alternative to execution, was widespread in primitive societies lacking a state system. Indeed, the Quran refers to this practice in verse 33 of Surah Al-Ma’ida: “The penalty for those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and strive upon earth [to cause] corruption is none other than that they be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be banished from the land. That is for them a disgrace in this world; and for them in the Hereafter is a great punishment.” This confirms that this was by no means an Amazigh “first,” especially since the practice was already known and carried out by other peoples prior to Islam.
While banishment did not vanish entirely in state-organized societies, its application remained restricted to specific offenses distinct from capital crimes. For instance, the French dictionary CNRTL defines legal banishment as “an ignominious political punishment consisting of prohibiting the convicted person from residing in the national territory for a specified period.” Thus, when applied by a state, banishment bears no connection to violent crimes or homicides, unlike its use for such offenses in tribal societies that predated the emergence of the state.
Realism and rationality: avoiding the fabrication of an “Amazigh miracle” myth:
Boasting that the Imazighen were pioneers in abolishing the death penalty and practicing secularism—now that the developed world calls for abolishing capital punishment and celebrates the tolerance guaranteed by secularism—puts us, as advocates of the Amazigh cause seeking its rehabilitation, in a position similar to proponents of the “scientific miracles in the Quran” myth. With every new scientific discovery or truth, the latter rush to twist Quranic texts to claim, in a caricatured and laughable manner, that the Quran had anticipated these scientific breakthroughs.
While it is legitimate for peoples to take pride in their culture, celebrate their ancestors’ achievements, and glorify their past—even when that past was not always bright and glorious—this must not cross the bounds of reason, lest it descend into absurdity and foolishness. The best service we can render to the past, and the most meaningful way to honor it, is to approach it with realism and rationality, free from artificiality or excessive exaggeration. It is undoubtedly this lack of realism and rationality that led us to believe we were pioneers of secularism and the abolition of the death penalty—two claims we fondly brandish as a sort of “Amazigh miracle.” If we examined these two issues with clarity and pragmatism, we would recognize that the absence of capital punishment among the Imazighen, alongside the absence of prisons and the practice of a form of secularism, are phenomena that reflect not social and intellectual progress, but rather a historical lag manifested in the late development of the state system among the Imazighen.
When I state that the Imazighen did not experience a state system, I am not referring to the ephemeral and temporary forms of an Amazigh state that emerged and dissolved during tribal coalitions formed to defend territory and raise troops under a leader acting as commander. Such forms of organization existed among the Imazighen as they did among other peoples lacking state institutions. Rather, I refer to an Amazigh state characterized by historical continuity—one that should have endured uninterrupted from its inception through all stages of Amazigh history, much like the Persians, Greeks, Romans, China, Japan, India, or Pharaonic Egypt.
Arabic version | French version

Mohamed Boudhan was an Amazigh writer, thinker, researcher and activist from the Rif, and publisher of the newspaper Tawiza. He was the author of many valuable books and articles on Amazigh identity. May he rest in peace.